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I.

INTRODUCTION
Nations around the world are responding to terrorism with a combination of law

enforcement measures and military action.1 In the United States, for example, the federal
government has prosecuted terrorists responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,2 the
1998 assaults on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,3 and the attacks of September 11,
2001.4 At the same time, the government also has been using its armed forces against al-Qaida
terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, and other places.5 Other countries also are
fighting terrorism with both criminal proceedings and military force, including Egypt,6 Israel,7
Russia,8 Turkey,9 and the United Kingdom.10

1

For a general treatment of law enforcement, military, and other governmental responses to terrorism, see GREGORY
E. MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2005).
2
See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1112 (1999) (prosecution of
terrorists who detonated a van full of explosives under one of the towers of the World Trade Center in New York
City, killing six, injuring 1400 others, and caused over $500 million of property damages).
3
See United States v. Bin Laden, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, No. S(7), 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2001),
available at <available at <http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-78.htm> (sentencing of terrorists who participated in the
bombing of the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and
wounding thousands of others).
4
The United States has convicted Zacarias Moussaoui of conspiring with the hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks.
See See Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Given Life Term by Jury over Link to 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006.
5
Complete official news on the United States’ military campaign against terrorism is available at
<http://www.defendamerica.mil>. Discussion of several of military responses appears in part II below.
6
See Susan Sachs, A Nation Challenged: Bin Laden’s Allies; An Investigation in Egypt Illustrates Al Qaeda’s Web,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at A1 (describing major anti-terrorism prosecutions in Egypt); Associated Press, Egypt
Sentences 6 To Death for Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at 12 (describing military process used against
suspected terrorists).
7
See Uri Dan, Israel Blows Away 2 Top Terrorists, N.Y. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at 30 (describing targeted killing of
suspected terrorists); Charles A. Radin, Palestinian Leader Convicted in Israel Five Life Terms Sought in Killings,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 2004, at A8 (describing prosecution of terrorists in Israel).
8
See Nadezhda Gaisenok & Alexander Shashkov, Russia Court to Examine Appeal of 3 Chechens Convicted for
Terror, TASS, Nov. 9, 2005 (discussing criminal prosecution of terrorists in Russia); David Holley, Separatists Tied
to ‘99 Bombings, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2003, at 5 (discussion Russian military responses to terrorist bombings of
apartment buildings in Moscow).
9
See Andrew Finkel, A Foregone Conviction; the Trial of Kurdish Leader Abdullah Ocalan Is Set to Begin in
Turkey amid Questions of Fairness, T IME, Jun. 7, 1999, at 39; Sam Cohen, Turkey’s Military Rulers Post a Sharp
Decline in Terrorism, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 25, 1980, at 6 (addressing Turkey’s military responses to
terrorism).

2

Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=965433

When governments respond to terrorism, a debate often arises about the legality of the
steps taken. As this article will show with numerous examples, the debate has familiar contours.
Opponents of counterterrorism measures typically argue that they violate legal guarantees
designed to protect criminal suspects. They assert, for instance, that domestic and international
laws do not permit the government simply to shoot suspected terrorists, or to detain them
indefinitely, or to try them outside of ordinary courts. But governments and their supporters
have a standard reply to this objection. They assert that they are not merely addressing crime,
but instead are fighting a war against terrorism, and that the law applicable to armed conflict
allows them to employ the measures that they have used. In the United States, the familiar
refrain is: “We took these kinds of actions in World War II when we were fighting the Nazis and
the Japanese, and therefore we can take them in the war that we are fighting against al-Qaida.”11
So at present debates about the legality of governmental responses to terrorism often boil
down to disagreements about which law governs. Is it the law that regulates law enforcement
actions? Or is it the law of armed conflict? The choice matters. Those who believe that the
rules that apply to law enforcement actions must govern military responses to terrorism consider
many of the responses that governments actually have taken to be illegal. And those who believe
that the law of armed conflict applies tend to think that they fall wholly within accepted
standards of war fighting.
Take the issue of targeted killing. A country engages in targeted killing when it locates
and summarily kills a suspected terrorist. The United States has engaged in this practice in its
10

See David Leppard & Richard Woods, Britain’s Secret War on Terror, SUNDAY TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at 16
(describing the use of trials to combat terrorism); Brian Lavery, Britain to Halve its Forces in Ulster, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Aug. 3, 2005, at 3 (describing British military responses to terrorism in Northern Ireland).
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struggle against terrorism. For example, in the summer of 2006, the Air Force killed Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, the leader of in al-Qaeda in Iraq, by locating his safe house and then dropping bombs
on his house.12 A few years earlier, the CIA fired missiles at suspected members of al-Qaida in
Yemen, without trying to bring them into custody.13 Israel also has done targeted killing,
attacking Palestinians in the West Bank, Syria, and other places.14 And Russia reportedly once
sent a poisonous letter to kill a Chechen leader.15
Is the targeted killing of suspected terrorists lawful? As explained more fully below,16
everyone agrees that ordinary law enforcement rules in the United States (and in most other
places) do not generally permit the police simply to kill criminal suspects. Instead, they must
attempt to arrest them. The police can use deadly force only to prevent a suspect from escaping,
and then only if the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to others and, if feasible, the
police previously have given the suspect a warning.17 In contrast, long established principles of
the law of war say that military forces generally may target and kill enemy forces in the course of
a lawful armed conflict, wherever they find them, and without giving them a chance to surrender,
unless the enemy forces already have lain down their weapons and given themselves up.18

11

See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, Fanatics in Court, SUN-SENTINEL, Jul. 26, 2002, at 31A (“We never threw open our
courtroom doors to captured Nazi prisoners of war in World War II, much less gave them access to our press.”).
12
Farnaz Fassihi, et al., Fateful Strike: Zarqawi’s Death, Completion of Cabinet Raise Hopes in Iraq, WALL ST. J.,
Jun. 9, 2006, at A-1.
13
See Reuters, Rights Group Questions Attack; Amnesty Says U.S. Missile Strike in Yemen May be Illegal, WASH.
POST, Nov. 9, 2002 at A21 (describing an incident in which the CIA killed persons suspected of participating in the
bombing of the U.S.S. Cole). For further discussion, see part II.C. infra.
14
See Joel Greenberg, Palestinian Militant Slain in Damascus; Israel Blamed; Revenge Vowed, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Sept. 27, 2004, at 3 (describing Israel’s practice of targeted killing).
15
See Peter Baker, Russia Moving to Eliminate Chechen Rebel Leaders, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2004, at A13
(reporting that Russia reported killa guerrilla called “Khattab” in 2002 with a poisoned letter).
16
See infra part II.B. (describing legal rules that may apply to targeted killing).
17
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
18
See U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, ch. 2, sec. II, ¶ 29 (1956) (citing Annex to Hague
Convention No. IV, Oct. 18, 1907, embodying the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
art. 23(c)).
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But what do these two sets of rules say about the targeted killing of suspected terrorists?
At present, the answer appears to depend on which of the two sets of rules apply. Opponents of
targeted killing might view suspected terrorists as criminal suspects, concluding that the
government cannot simply target and kill them. Meanwhile, proponents of targeted killing by
military forces might consider the suspected terrorists to have the status of enemy combatants in
an armed conflict. If the two sides disagree on the proper characterization of the suspected
terrorists and of the governmental action taken against them, they will reach conflicting views
about which set of legal rules should apply. In turn, they will arrive at different conclusions
about the legality of any targeted killing.
In this article, I make three claims concerning this issue. In part II, I claim that
characterizing counterterrorism measures as either law enforcement efforts or military actions for
the purpose of determining their legality is now and long has been a central feature of
counterterrorism law. Disputes over characterization have arisen in no fewer than eight different
subject areas, ranging from targeted killing to the responsibility of the government to provide
compensation to persons inadvertently injured by the governmental action. Disagreements about
characterization further have arisen not only in the United States but also in many foreign
countries. And these disputes are not new; they have occurred for many decades.
In part III, I claim that determining the legality of governmental responses to terrorism by
attempting to characterize counterterrorism measures as either law enforcement or military
action is not a good system. Terrorists, and counterterrorism efforts, generally defy simple
characterization into one category or another because terrorists resemble enemy combatants in
some ways and criminal suspects in others. In addition, the different subject areas in which the
5

issue of characterization arises vary from each other in so many respects that a characterization
that makes sense in one area does not necessarily make sense in another. In fact, as the article
will show, the United States has found it difficult to take a consistent view on characterization,
despite the centrality of the question.
In part IV, I claim that the law would be improved by moving to a system that judges
counterterrorism measures as counterterrorism measures, without trying to characterize them as
either law enforcement actions or military actions. In other words, the United States and other
nations ought to develop new standards to regulate governmental responses to terrorism, rather
than debating whether the laws of war or the rules of law enforcement should apply. Already
imperfect examples of this alternative approach are emerging. They include both the Israeli
Supreme Court’s 2006 decision on targeted killing and, to some extent, the thinking behind the
Military Commission Act of 2006.19

II.

HOW DEBATES OVER THE LEGALITY OF COUNTERTERRORISM
MEASURES NOW TURN ON WHETHER THE MEASURES ARE
CHARACTERIZED AS LAW ENFORCEMENT OR MILITARY ACTION
The following demonstrates how, for many years, courts and others have judged the

legality of counterterrorism measures by characterizing them as law enforcement or military
action.20 This observation holds true for a wide variety of different kinds of responses to
terrorism, in domestic, foreign, and international law.

A.
19

Authority to Use Force in Foreign Countries

See infra part IV.D.

6

May a nation lawfully respond to a terrorist incident by using military force in a foreign
country? This question often has great importance. Terrorist organizations sometimes have
foreign bases of operation. In addition, after committing their assaults, terrorists often flee
across borders. For these reasons, the United States and other nations may wish to make
counterattacks abroad. The U.N. Charter generally forbids nations to use military force in
foreign countries. Article 2(4) says: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”21 But the
U.N. Charter has an exception in article 51 recognizing that nations have a right to use force
when responding in self-defense to an “armed attack.”22
So the precise legal issue is this: If a nation responds to a terrorist incident by using
military force in a foreign country, does that violate the U.N. Charter? If the terrorist incident
was an “armed attack” within the meaning of article 51, then the response may be lawful. But if
the terrorist incident was not an “armed attack,” but instead merely a crime, then the response
would violate the prohibition in article 2(4).
In past instances, national governments and international organizations have drawn
conflicting conclusions on the very basic question of whether terrorists are just criminals or
whether they are forces capable of mounting an “armed attacked.” As a result, observers have

20

The discussion makes no claims about which side of the debate has the better argument as matter of policy or
which side should win in the courts.
21
Charter of the United Nations, 1945, art. 2(4), 1 UNTS 16 [hereinafter “U.N. Charter”].
22
Id. art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of
self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council . . . .”).
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different views about the lawfulness of extra-territorial military responses to terrorism. Here are
three prominent examples.
(1) In 2004, at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, the International
Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on the legality of a lengthy fence or separation
barrier constructed by Israel.23 Israel built the barrier to block terrorists from entering Israel.24
The barrier partially follows Israel’s internationally recognized borders, but in many places it
also runs through the occupied territory of the West Bank.25
The International Court of Justice considered, among other issues, whether article 51
could excuse Israel’s use of force (i.e., the building of the fence) outside of its borders as a
measure taken in self-defense.26 The court concluded that it could not, giving two alternative
reasons. First, the court said that “Article 51 of the Charter . . . recognizes the existence of an
inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State” and
that “Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State.”27 Second,
the court said that the threat originated from territory that Israel controls, and that Article 51
therefore does not apply.28

23

See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2003 I.C.J. No. 131
(advisory opinion of Jul. 9, 2004).
24
See id. ¶ 116.
25
See id. ¶ 122.
26
See id. ¶ 138. Israel did not press a substantive argument before the court. It contended that General Assembly
had acted in an ultra vires manner in seeking an advisory opinion because the Security Council was actively
addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. See id. ¶ 24. In addition, because the General Assembly was seeking an
advisory opinion, and had not named Israel as party to the lawsuit, Israel had no duty to make a substance argument.
See id. (declaration of Judge Burgenthal), at ¶ 10. But the Court noted that Israel previously had told the United
Nations General Assembly that it was constructing the fence in self-defense. Israel cited Security Council
Resolution No. 1368 to support its argument. See id. ¶ 138.
27
Id. ¶ 139.
28
See id.
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In other words, the court concluded that Israel cannot use force but must instead use
ordinary law enforcement measures to deal with the terrorist threat.29 Praising the decision,
Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell has written: “the situation Israel faced at the time of the
Advisory Opinion was more akin to terrorist attacks perpetrated by the state’s own nationals
within the state’s own territory because of the measure of control Israel exercises over the
occupied territories. Terrorist attacks by nationals within their own state have invariably been
treated as criminal. . . .”30
But not everyone agrees with this position. Judge Burgenthal of the International Court
of Justice filed a separate declaration in the case. Although he principally asserted that the court
should not have exercised jurisdiction,31 he also specifically disagreed with the court’s reasons
for rejecting Israel’s self-defense argument. He asserted that the U.N. charter does not permit
self-defense only against armed attacks from other nations and that it was “irrelevant” whether
Israel controlled the occupied territories.32 In his view, in assessing Israel’s position under
article 51, the court should have judged Israel’s actions by their “necessity and
proportionality.”33 In other words, Judge Burgenthal did not think that nations were necessarily
restricted to using only law enforcements measures against terrorist acts.
(2) On September 11, 2001, members of al-Qaida infamously hijacked and crashed four
aircraft in the United States. The United States responded by using military force against alQaida in Afghanistan. In pursuing this action, the United States took the position that it was

29

See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-state Actors through a Global War on Terror?, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 451 (2005).
30
Id.
31
See 2003 I.C.J. No. 131 (declaration of Judge Burgenthal) at ¶ 1.
32
See id. ¶ 6.
33
Id.

9

fighting a war and could do what the laws applicable to armed conflict allow. The United States
informed the United Nations Security Council, as article 51 requires, that it was acting in selfdefense in response to an “armed attack.”34 The United States also persuaded NATO to agree to
this characterization of the terrorist attacks.35
But not all observers share the United States and NATO’s view. The Security Council
itself never specifically called the terrorist incidents an “armed attack.” Instead, it issued a
diplomatically worded statement both condemning the assaults and “[r]ecognizing the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.”36 The statement
did not specifically say that the Charter authorized the use of force by the United States.37
Professor Sean Murphy has offered an explanation for why some might consider the
events of September 11th not to rise to the level of an armed attack.38 Murphy notes that the
terrorists did not operate as military or paramilitary units and that they were armed only with box
cutters—“not weapons one would normally associate with military or paramilitary units.”39
Although he does not endorse the position, he raises the question whether “this was not an
‘armed attack’ but, rather, a use of force or intervention below the threshold of armed attack,

34

See U.N. Charter, supra note 21, art. 51 (“Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council . . . .”).
35
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, available at
<www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm> (“[I]t has now been determined that the attack against the United
States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5
of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all.”).
36
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001).
37
See id.
38
See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 41 (2002).
39
Id. at 45.
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which is perhaps better characterized as a conventional (albeit heinous) criminal act.”40 If that is
the correct characterization, then only law enforcement measures would be permissible.
(3) In 1998, following attacks by al-Qaida on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the
United States responded by firing missiles at suspected al-Qaida targets in Sudan and
Afghanistan.41 The United States informed the Security Council, again as article 51 requires,
that it was acting in self-defense to an armed attack.42
But others disagree with this characterization of the bombings. Sudan has protested the
action.43 And some scholars have judged the United States in law enforcement terms; Professor
Jules Lobel says: “It is self-serving hypocrisy for the United States to attack alleged terrorist
facilities, violate other nations’ sovereignty, and kill innocent civilians, using evidence that
would not suffice to sustain a criminal prosecution.”44
Other extra-territorial uses of military force to respond to terrorist attacks have led to
similar debates about the applicability of article 51. The United Nations General Assembly
condemned the United States’ 1986 strike on Libya in response to a nightclub bombing in
Berlin.45 And the Security Council (with the United States abstaining) condemned Israel’s 1985

40

Id. at 46.
See El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S.
Ct. 2963 (2005) (discussing these attacks).
42
The second sentence of article 51 requires a nation exercising self-defense to notify the security council. See U.N.
Charter art. 51 (“Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council . . . .”). The United States fulfilled this requirement by sending a letter describing
the reasons for the attacks in Sudan and Afghanistan. See Letter from Bill Richardson, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, to Danilo Turk, President, U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc S/1998/780 (Aug
20, 1998).
43
See Craig Turner, Sudan Gets Little Support for a U.N. Probe of U.S. Attack, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1998, at A6.
44
See Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 551 (1999).
45
The United States viewed the terrorist incident was an armed attack, and that it therefore concluded that it could
use military force in self-defense under article 51. But the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution
that “[c]ondemns the military attack perpetrated against the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 15 April
41

11

bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization headquarters near Tunis in response to an
attack on a Tunisian synagogue.46 In each of these many incidents, observers disagreed about
the legality of a government response to terrorism because they disagreed about whether to
characterize it as a response to crime or an act taken in an armed conflict.

B.

Authority to Use Force Domestically
Is it lawful for a nation to use military force domestically in response to terrorism? The

laws of each country will provide a different answer. But again the answer generally turns on
whether the perpetrators are characterized as criminal suspects or as enemy combatants, and thus
whether the government in responding is fighting crime or fighting a war. Usually there are two
bodies of law, one for law enforcement and one for armed conflicts, and governmental responses
to terrorism must be pigeon-holed into one or the other whenever a legal dispute arises.

In the

United States, as in other countries, federal law limits the domestic use of military forces. The
Posse Comitatus Act, in particular, makes it a crime for any government official to use the
Armed Forces for law enforcement purposes.47 The historic purpose of the Act was to end the
use of federal troops in the former areas of the Confederacy after the Civil War.”48 But the law
has modern justifications as well. The Act preserves federalism by making state and local
1986, which constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law . . . .” G.A. Res.
38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 78th plenary mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/38 (Nov. 20, 1986).
46
Israel asserted that it was acting in self-defense in response to an armed attack as permitted under article 51. But
the Security Council (with the United States abstaining) passed a resolution saying that it “[c]ondemns vigorously
the act of armed aggression perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the
United Nations International Law and norms of conduct . . . .” S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 2615th meeting, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/573 (1985).
47
The Posse Comitatus Act says: “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 18
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governments responsible for most law enforcement. It also guards against the possibility that
soldiers who lack training for law enforcement activities do not violate the civil liberties of
citizens.
But is responding to terrorism a law enforcement measure or a military action? Two
recent incidents have raised this question. One involves an American citizen named Jose Padilla.
According to stipulated (but not proved) facts:
Padilla . . . associated with forces hostile to the United States in Afghanistan and
took up arms against United States forces in that country in our war against al
Qaeda. Upon his escape to Pakistan from the battlefield in Afghanistan, Padilla
was recruited, trained, funded, and equipped by al Qaeda leaders to continue
prosecution of the war in the United States by blowing up apartment buildings in
this country. Padilla flew to the United States on May 8, 2002, to begin carrying
out his assignment . . . .49
Federal agents took Padilla into custody at Chicago’s O’Hare airport.50 They initially held him
as a material witness to a grand jury proceeding.51 But the President later designated him an
“enemy combatant.”52 Afterward, with the blessing of the federal courts, the United States
military held Padilla in a naval brig for several years.53 Still later, the United States indicted
Padilla and took him into criminal custody.54
In extensive litigation, the federal courts considered a number of issues regarding
Padilla’s confinement.55 Padilla at one point challenged his custody by the military as a violation

U.S.C. § 1385. A “posse comitatus” is a “group of citizens who are called together to assist the sheriff in keeping
the peace.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 8th ed. 1999).
48
Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
49
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 386 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 26 S. Ct. 1649 (2006).
50
See id.
51
See id. at 390.
52
See id. at 388.
53
See id. at 390.
54
See Padilla v. C.T. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring denial of certiorari) (describing
Padilla’s classification and reclassification).
55
See id. at 397 (upholding Padilla’s confinement).
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of the Posse Comitatus Act.56 He alleged that military forces were aiding law enforcement by
detaining him. But the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York did
not see Padilla’s detention as a law enforcement matter. It said:
Padilla is not being detained by the military in order to execute a civilian law or
for violating a civilian law, notwithstanding that his alleged conduct may in fact
violate one or more such laws. He is being detained in order to interrogate him
about the unlawful organization with which he is said to be affiliated and with
which the military is in active combat, and to prevent him from becoming
reaffiliated with that organization.57
The court therefore found no violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Again, characterization
determined which legal regime applied to the governmental action.
The second incident involved a pair of snipers who terrorized the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Virginia in 2002. John Muhammad and Lee Malvo drove through suburban
areas, with one or both of them shooting people at random through a hole they had made in the
trunk of their car.58 The attacks went on for weeks, with 11 persons shot and thousands terrified.
Muhammad and Malvo never made their aims fully clear, although they did ask for money at one
point.59
In an effort to apprehend the snipers, the FBI requested assistance from the Department
of Defense.60 The Department of Defense responded by providing an Army surveillance
airplane.61 The aircraft had the ability to cover a large area and to use special electronic
equipment to detect the heat and sound of small arms fire, possibly including shots fired by the
56

See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.2d 564, 588 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 595 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
57
Id.
58
See Adam Liptak, Teenage Sniper to Plead Guilty in Two Shootings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2004, at A10.
59
See Carol Morello, Victims’ Relatives Still Ask, “Why?”; Snipers’ Motives Remain Unresolved, WASH. POST,
Mar. 11, 2004, at A11.
60
DoD News Briefing, Sec’y of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, Oct. 17, 2002, available at
<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t10172002_t1017sd.html> [hereinafter DoD Sniper Briefing].
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snipers from their rifle.62 If the Department of Defense could provide instantaneous information
about the location of gun shots across the area, the FBI hoped that it could locate and apprehend
the snipers.63
Critics argued that the surveillance activity violated the Posse Comitatus Act because it
was a form of military assistance to law enforcement.64 But others disagreed; some supporters of
the plan said that the Posse Comitatus Act does not prevent the military from engaging in
“passive” support to law enforcement.65 When asked at a Press Conference about the legality of
the Army’s assistance to the FBI, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld simply said: “We have
looked at our assets and capabilities and tried to determine what we might do to be of assistance
to them that’s consistent with the law, the Posse Comitatus law. . . . We do know that what we’re
doing is fully consistent with the law, full stop.”66 Secretary Rumsfeld also likened the action to
“combat air patrols flying, looking for airplanes that might crash into the White House or the
Capitol or the Pentagon or the World Trade Center.”67 He said that military forces can prevent a
“bad act” and “it’s not quite law enforcement.”68
Thus, again, rather than attempting to view military responses to terrorism as a separate
category, and to determine what rules should apply to that category, the disputants contested
whether the responses should be viewed either as a law enforcement measure or as military
actions taken in an armed conflict.
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The United States is not alone in debating this kind of issue. In 1995, the Russian
Constitutional Court had to decide whether Russia’s constitution banned the use of military
forces against Chechen rebels.69 The Russian Federation was using military force pursuant to
decrees issued by President Yeltsin and pursuant to resolutions of the State Duma (which is the
lower house of Russia’s bicameral parliament).70 The Federation Council of the Russian
Federation (which is the upper chamber of the parliament) and other plaintiffs challenged this
domestic use of military force in the Russian Constitutional Court.71
The Federation Council argued that the use of armed forces in Russia’s territory under
Russia’s constitution is only permitted if the Federal Council declares a state of emergency or
martial law.72 In other words, the Federation Council argued that military measures could not be
used because there was no recognized armed conflict. Presumably, the Federation Council
believed that the Russian government could use only conventional law enforcement techniques
to address the situation. But the Constitutional Court upheld the use of force.73 It rejected the
idea that only law enforcement agencies could respond to the crisis. The court noted that the
Duma had concluded that “the disarmament of the unlawful armed militia raised in that republic,
which were using tanks, missile launchers, artillery systems and war planes, ‘was impossible in
principle without the use of regular troops.’”74 The court thus saw the situation more like an
armed conflict.
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Once again, what neither side in the dispute considered was the possibility that
counterterrorism measures might fall into a separate category. They appeared to view the
question simply as whether terrorism amounted to an armed conflict or instead was just a matter
for criminal law enforcement. They did not recognize the possibility that terrorism may lie
somewhere in between war and crime, and that separate rules should determine the permissibility
of particular responses to terrorism.

C.

Targeted Killing
Targeted killing is the practice of shooting or using bombs or other methods to kill

suspected terrorists without attempting to arrest them. The United States has used this
counterterrorism measure a number of times. In June 2006, the United States killed the al-Qaida
leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, by dropping two 500-pound bombs on what al-Zarqawi
thought was a safe-house.75 In January 2005, the United States attempted to kill Ayman alZawahiri, reputedly Osama bin Laden’s chief lieutenant, by destroying a house in Pakistan.76 As
it turned out, Al-Zawahiri was not in the building, but the strike killed other suspected terrorists
(as well a large number of women and children).77 In December 2004, the United States killed
al-Qaida operations chief Hamza Rabia with a missile near the Afghanistan and Pakistan
border.78 In November 2002, the United States fired a missile at and killed Qaed Salim Sinan alHarethi, one of the masterminds of the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole as he was riding in a car in
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Yemen.79 In fact, these five incidents actually represent only a small fraction of the total number
of suspected terrorists targeted by the United States. The Los Angeles Times reported in January
2006 that “the United States is expanding a top-secret effort to kill suspected terrorists with
drone-fired missiles as it pursues an increasingly decentralized Al Qaeda.”80 The details
concerning the number of strikes apparently are classified, but the reporter counted a total of 19
separate targeted killings that have occurred so far.
Other nations also have used targeted killing to dispense with suspected terrorists.
Russia, as mentioned above, reportedly sent a poison letter to the person suspected of
masterminding the 2000 Moscow apartment bombing.81 Israel has killed scores of suspected
members of Hamas, using everything from helicopter gunships to exploding cell phones.82
A basic question is whether the targeted killing of suspected terrorists is lawful. At
present, the answer, like so many answers, depends on whether the action is viewed as a law
enforcement measure or as a step taken in an armed conflict. In general, the police cannot
simply kill criminal suspects, but instead must arrest them. In contrast, the military usually can
kill enemy combatants without attempting to arrest them unless they already have surrendered.
Consider first the rules regarding law enforcement. In the United States, the Fifth
Amendment plainly says: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . .”83 And the Fourth Amendment similarly prohibits “unreasonable”
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searches and seizures.84 Based on these provisions, our courts have held that a police officer
may not “seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”85 Instead, the police
are supposed to arrest suspects so that courts may determine their innocence or guilt and rule on
their punishment.
Multilateral treaties embody similar protections. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which the United States and most other nations have ratified, says: “Every
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.”86 The European Convention on Human Rights says:
“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime
for which this penalty is provided by law.”87 The European Convention contains exceptions
allowing the police to kill criminal suspects, but only “in order to effect a lawful arrest or to
prevent escape of a person lawfully detained.”88
The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials addresses the subject in detail.89 Article 9 says that “intentional lethal use
of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”90 Article 10
further says that “law enforcement officials shall identify themselves as such and shall give a
84
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clear warning of their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warnings to be observed,
unless to do so would unduly place the law enforcement officials at risk or would create a risk of
death or serious harm to other persons . . . .”91 Under all of these various rules, targeted killing
of criminal suspects is illegal.
But the laws governing armed conflict are different. When military forces are fighting a
war, they may attack enemy forces wherever they find them without affording them an
opportunity to surrender. This has been the law for a long time. In the United States, the Lieber
Code of 1863 (promulgated as a military order to govern Union Forces during the Civil War)
famously declared: “Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed
enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed
contests of the war . . . .”92 Still today, military forces may kill enemy combatants who have not
surrendered,93 and nothing in the law of armed conflict requires military forces to afford the
enemy the opportunity to surrender before attacking them.
True, some prohibitions on assassination apply to the military. For example, the Annex
to Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, says: “In
addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden . . . [t]o
kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army . . . .”94 The U.S.
Army interprets this provision “as prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an
90
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enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy’s head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy ‘dead
or alive.’”95 But the Army also says that the provision does not “preclude attacks on individual
soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or
elsewhere.”96 So under the U.S. view, military forces could kill suspected terrorists if they are
enemy combatants.
A recent dispute illustrates how the categorization of targeting killing affects the analysis
of its legality. In November 2002, as mentioned above, the United States used an unmanned
Predator aircraft to attack a car in Yemen.97 The car was carrying six men, all of whom died in
the attack. One of the men was Abu Ali al-Harethi, an al-Qaida member suspected of
masterminding the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.98 Another one of the men
in the car was an American citizen named Ahmed Hijazi.99 The United States and the
government of Yemen worked together in planning and executing the attack.100
Subsequently, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions wrote a letter to the United States asking the government to explain the
incident and justify the killing of the men in the car.101 The letter referred to the provisions of
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights quoted above.102 In the letter, the
Special Rapporteur said that the action “constitutes a clear case of extrajudicial killing.”103 In
other words, the Special Rapporteur saw the incident as an impermissible method of law
enforcement.
The United States had a different view. It saw the military action not as a law
enforcement measure, but instead as a method of fighting a war against an armed enemy. In its
response, the United States said: “The United States . . . disagrees with the premise of the letter
and the conclusions contained in the report that military operations against enemy combatants
could be regarded as ‘extrajudicial executions by consent of Governments.’”104 In its view, the
“conduct of a government in legitimate military operations, whether against Al Qaida operatives
or any other legitimate military target, would be governed by the international law of armed
conflict.”105 Under that law, the United States said, “enemy combatants may be attacked unless
they have surrendered or are otherwise rendered hors de combat.”106 Accordingly, the United
States concluded, “Al Qaida terrorists who continue to plot attacks against the United States may
be lawful subjects of armed attack in appropriate circumstances.”107

D.

Detention
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The rules that govern the detention of criminal suspects differ from the rules that govern
the detention of enemy combatants. For this reason, the characterization of persons held as
terrorists often is very important. If these persons are viewed as criminal suspects, they
generally have greater rights than if they are viewed as enemy combatants in an armed conflict.
Under the domestic law of the United States, law enforcement agencies generally may
detain criminal suspects only for the purpose of bringing them before a court for trial.108
Suspects are entitled to appear before a magistrate without unreasonable delay after they are
arrested.109 This magistrate must order them released if probable cause does not exist to believe
that they have committed a crime.110 Even if probable cause does exist, the suspects then have a
right to a speedy trial.111 If they do not receive a speedy trial, they are entitled to dismissal of
any indictment and to release.112
Similar rules govern law enforcement outside the United States. For example, article 5 of
the European Convention on Human Rights provides: “No one shall be deprived of his liberty
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: . . . (c) the
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lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence . . . .”113
But the law of armed conflict differs in several very important ways when it comes to
questions of detention. The law of armed conflict contemplates that in a war, a nation may need
to capture numerous enemy combatants and may need to hold them for many years. The United
States, for example, imprisoned hundreds of thousands of captured German, Italian, and Japanese
soldiers during World War II.114 Although litigants and commentators recently have disputed
some of these points, the following rules appear to apply to the detention of enemy combatants:
First, the law of armed conflict apparently permits a government to detain all enemy
belligerents regardless of whether they have committed any crimes. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a
plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the “capture and detention of lawful combatants
and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by ‘universal agreement and
practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of war.’”115 Justice Thomas, a fifth vote for this proposition,
agreed that the government may detain captured belligerents without charges.116 This rule
apparently applies regardless of the location in which the government captured the belligerent or
whether the belligerent is a United States citizen.117
Second, the government apparently needs to follow only minimal procedures for initially
determining who is an enemy combatant and who is not. These procedures apparently may place
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the burden of proof on the detainee.118 They may establish a presumption in favor of the
government’s evidence even if the evidence is based on hearsay.119 The government apparently
also does not have to afford the detainee the right to counsel.120
Third, if the military determines that a person is a belligerent, it may detain him at least
for the duration of the conflict in which he was captured.121 This rule allowed the United States
to hold German, Italian, and Japanese prisoners in World War II until the hostilities ceased. The
government does not have to release all detainees when the war ends; on the contrary, if the
government convicts a detainee of war crimes, it may also imprison him or her as sentenced by a
court just like any other criminal suspect.
As a result of these rules, suspected terrorists face very different treatment depending on
whether they are viewed as criminal suspects or instead as enemy combatants. So naturally
many debates have arisen over how to characterize suspected terrorists. An ongoing example of
this debate concerns persons whom the United States has detained in its war on terror.
Consider again the case of Jose Padilla, the American citizen who fought against the
United States in Afghanistan and who was captured at O’Hare airport in Chicago.122 When
Padilla challenged the legality of his confinement in a naval brig without charges, a debate
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quickly arose over how to characterize him. The district court viewed Padilla as a criminal
suspect. It said:
Simply stated, this is a law enforcement matter, not a military matter. The
civilian authorities captured Petitioner just as they should have. At the time that
Petitioner was arrested . . . any alleged terrorist plans that he harbored were
thwarted. From then on, he was available to be questioned—and was indeed
questioned—just like any other citizen accused of criminal conduct. This is as it
should be.123
Because the government had not brought criminal charges against Padilla, the district court
ordered Padilla released, just as it would order the release of any criminal suspect whom the
government had not charged.124 The district court left open the possibility that the government
could continue to hold Padilla if it were to bring criminal charges against him.125
Outside organizations agree with this characterization of terrorist suspects. Amnesty
International, for example, has declared that the detention of suspected terrorists without charges
by the United States is a “continuing violation of human rights standards which the international
community must not ignore.”126 It has urged that “detainees should be charged with
recognisably criminal offences and tried within a reasonable time, or released.”127
But the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expressed a different view when it
considered the Padilla case. It reversed the district court because it agreed that the President
could characterize Padilla as an “enemy combatant” rather than as a mere criminal suspect.128
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The court then held: “Because Padilla is an enemy combatant, and because his detention is . . .
necessary . . . in order to prevent his return to the battlefield, the President is authorized . . . to
detain Padilla as a fundamental incident to the conduct of war.”129 The Supreme Court never
resolved this issue because before it could review the decision, the United States obtained an
indictment against Padilla and began treating him as an ordinary criminal suspect, thus mooting
the question.130
The debate about whether to characterize persons accused of terrorism as criminal
suspects or enemy combatants in determining whether the government has the power to detain
them is not confined to the United States. For example, nearly five decades ago, the Irish
government held a man named Richard Lawless for several months without charges.131 It
justified this detention on grounds that Lawless was suspected of belonging to the Irish
Republican Army (IRA), an organization described as “a secret army engaged in unconstitutional
activities and using violence to attain its purposes”132 and blamed for an “alarming increase in
terrorist activities.”133 The government contended that it needed to detain Lawless “to prevent
the maintaining of military or armed forces other than those authorised by the Constitution.”134
Thus, just as the United States saw Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant belonging to al-Qaida,
the Irish government saw Lawless as a soldier for the IRA.
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Lawless had a different view. He saw himself as a mere criminal suspect, and argued that
his detention without charges violated article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.135
This provision as quoted above, prohibits arrests other than for the purpose of bringing a criminal
suspect before a judge “on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence . . . .”136
Lawless argued that the Irish government had not brought him before a judge or asserted any
charges against him.137
The European Court of Human Rights sided with Lawless’s characterization, but it
denied him any relief. It concluded that the detention was contrary to article 5 of the European
Convention because the Irish government had not charged him with any offense.138 But it could
offer no remedy because it concluded that the Irish government had followed the proper
procedures for derogating from the European Human Rights Convention.139

E.

Trials
Criminal suspects have many rights when they come to trial in civilian courts. In the

United States, for example, the Fifth Amendment grants criminal suspects a general right to due
process and a specific right not to be tried absent a grand jury indictment,140 and the Sixth
Amendment affords them a right to have a speedy and public trial, to be tried by a jury, to be
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tried in the district where the crime occurred, and to confront the witnesses against them.141 And
multilateral treaties also require the United States and other nations to provide important trial
rights. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandates that
criminal suspects have a trial before an independent judge142 and appellate review by a separate
appellate tribunal.143
In contrast, some enemy combatants do not have the same rights when they come to trial
before a “military commission.” A military commission is a tribunal consisting of a panel of
military officers or a combination of military officers and civilians.144 The United States has
used military commissions throughout its history to try persons accused of war crimes.145
During and immediately after World War II, for instance, allied forces used military
commissions to try many German soldiers and civilians accused of war crimes.146 These war
crimes included many different kinds of offenses, including the offense of fighting as an
unlawful combatant.147
The Supreme Court has held that military commissions, absent contrary legislation, do
not have to follow the same trial procedures that civilian criminal courts use.148 Military
commissions, for example, need not provide persons suspected of war crimes with a trial by
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jury.149 They also do not have to state the charges against a suspect with the specificity of an
ordinary criminal indictment.150
Because criminal suspects have different rights from enemy combatants, the now familiar
debate over characterization arises when nations want to try persons accused of committing
terrorist acts. One side of the debate argues that these persons should be characterized as
criminal defendants and should have all of the rights that criminal defendants enjoy. The other
side argues that they can be characterized as enemy combatants and given trials by military
commission for committing war crimes, such as fighting as an unlawful combatant.
This debate has gone on for several years in the United States. In November 2001,
shortly after the infamous attacks of September 11th, President Bush ordered the creation of
military commissions to try foreign terror suspects now held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.151 This
order described these suspects not as criminals but as persons engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States.152 The order guaranteed them the right to a “full and fair” trial but did
not guarantee them all the rights that criminal defendants in the United States would have.153 As
a result, great controversy arose arisen over the legality of this counterterrorism measure. One of
the detainees facing trial by military commission, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, argued before the
Supreme Court that if he is accused of terrorist violence, he should be treated as a criminal
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suspect and charged in a federal civilian court.154 The government, in contrast, contended that he
was an enemy combatant, and that a military trial therefore could charge him.155
The Supreme Court avoided resolving the basic question of characterization raised in this
debate. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that even if Hamdan was an enemy combatant
and could be tried by a military commission, the President had improperly constituted the
military commissions at Guantanamo. The Court ruled that procedural and evidentiary rules
violated a provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which it interpreted to require the
rules of military commissions to be uniform with the rules of courts-martial unless the President
finds uniformity impracticable.156 (As explained below, Congress has responded by enacted a
new law to govern military commissions.157)
The European Court of Human Rights has confronted a similar question of
characterization. During the 1990s, Turkey used the Ankara State Security Court to try persons
suspected of terrorism.158 This court was not called a military commission but it resembled one
because it included a military officer as one of its judges.159 In 1994, this special court convicted
Selim Sadak and several others of terrorist offenses in connection with their support for the
banned Kurdish Workers Party.160 Sadak and the others subsequently sued Turkey in the
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European Court of Human Rights, claiming that the inclusion of a military officer on the Ankara
State Security Court violated the European Convention on Human Rights.161
The European Court of Human Rights agreed. In its view, Turkey had not given Sadak
and the other applicants the rights owed to criminal defendants.162 Article 6 of the European
Convention provides that “[i]n the determination of . . . any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair . . . hearing . . . by an independent and impartial tribunal . . . .” The
Court concluded that the military officer, although trained as a judge, would feel pressure to
convict the accused to satisfy the government, and thus that the court lacked impartiality.163
Turkey had disagreed with the characterization of Sadak and the others as mere criminals.
It argued that the nation was engaged in a military campaign against terrorism. “In view of the
experience of the armed forces in the anti-terrorism campaign,” the Turkish government
explained, it “had considered it necessary to strengthen [the Ankara State Security Court] by
including a military judge in order to provide the court with the necessary expertise and
knowledge of how to deal with threats to the security and integrity of the State.”164
Yet another example comes from Egypt. Throughout the 1990s, Egypt used military
courts to try militants suspected of threatening the government with terrorist acts. Egypt has
contended that these military courts are necessary for dealing with armed combatants.165 Human
rights groups, however, contend that they violate international standards for the treatment of
criminal suspects.166
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F.

Search and Seizure
The issue of whether to characterize counterterrorism measures as law enforcement or

military action arises in the context of search and seizure by the government. The
characterization matters because criminal suspects have rights to privacy that enemy combatants
traditionally have not had. For example, in the criminal law context, the Fourth Amendment
imposes an important restriction on law enforcement activity by requiring that searches and
seizures be reasonable.167 The Supreme Court has held that a “search or seizure is ordinarily
unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”168 So the police cannot
simply seize and search any homes, cars, and places of business merely in the hopes of finding
evidence of criminal activity.
In contrast, when the military is fighting a war, it does not face similar constraints. The
Supreme Court has held that the constitutional power to declare war necessarily “involves the
power to prosecute it by all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately
prosecuted.”169 Accordingly, the Court has reasoned, the federal government’s war power
“includes the right to seize and confiscate all property of an enemy and to dispose of it at the will
of the captor.”170 Indeed, the Court said: “This is and always has been an undoubted belligerent
right.”171
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These two differing sets of rules again lead to characterization disputes. In American
Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency,172 the ACLU challenged a secret surveillance
program. The National Security Agency, at the direction of the President, secretly listened to
telephone calls between persons in the United States and suspected members of al-Qaida. The
ACLU argued that the program violated the Fourth Amendment, analogizing it to eavesdropping
on persons during a criminal investigation without a warrant.173 But the United States argued
that it was a proper exercise of military force not addressed by the Fourth Amendment.174 The
district court sided with the ACLU on this question of characterization (although the litigation
continues). According to the district court, although Congress authorized the President to use
“all necessary and appropriate force” against the persons responsible for the attacks of
September 11, 2001, this authorization “says nothing whatsoever of intelligence or
surveillance.”175 Therefore, in the court’s view, the President could not lawfully be exercising
military force.176
Another example of a disagreement over characterization occurred in United States v.
Green.177 A woman named Green drove her car on a major road in San Antonio, Texas.178 The
road passed through Fort Sam Houston, an open military reservation through which the public
could drive.179 On the road, within the boundaries of the reservation, the post’s military police
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had set up a check point.180 At this check point, the military police were stopping every sixth car
to search for terrorists, as a means of deterring terrorism.181 Pursuant to this policy, the military
police stopped Green’s car. In the car, they found cocaine, and then arrested Green.182
Green argued that this suspicionless stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Citing the
rules summarized above, the court agreed that the search would have been unconstitutional if the
military police had simply been searching for criminals or trying to prevent general criminal
activity.183 But the court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit searches conducted
by the military when it is engaged in “the protection of the nation’s military installations from
acts of domestic or international terrorism.”184 The court reasoned that looking for terrorists on a
military reservation was more like this traditional military function than like criminal law
enforcement.185 As a result of the court’s characterizing the stop as a military action against
terrorism instead of a law enforcement measure, Green could not rely on the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.
A similar situation arose in the European Court of Human Rights in Murray v. United
Kingdom.186 The British Army went to the home of Murray to arrest her and question her about
suspected terrorist activities, including financing the procurement of arms for the IRA.187 Upon
entering the home, they searched it for other occupants, and made Murray’s family gather in one

180

See id. at 856-857.
See id. at 858. The military police were following the “Standard Operating Procedure for the Installation Force
Protection Vehicle Checkpoints.” Id. This document identified listed “protect[ing] national security by deterring
domestic and foreign acts of terrorism” as the first goal of checkpoint stops. Id.
182
See id. at 857.
183
See id. at 858 (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), and other decisions).
184
See id. at 859.
185
See id.
186
19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 193 (1995).
187
See id. ¶ 11.
181

35

room.188 Murray and her family challenged the army’s action under article 8 of the European
Convention.189 This article, which resembles the Fourth Amendment, provides that “[e]veryone
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” and it
generally prohibits interference with this right except when “necessary” for law enforcement,
public safety, and other purposes.190 But the court disagreed, observing that this was not an
ordinary law enforcement measure but instead a military security action. Citing the
“responsibility of an elected government in a democratic society to protect its citizens and its
institutions against the threats posed by organised terrorism and to the special problems involved
in the arrest and detention of persons suspected of terrorist-linked offences” the court found the
army’s actions to satisfy article 8’s requirement of “necessity.”191 So again, because the incident
was viewed as a military response rather than a law enforcement measure, Murray had different
rights from those an ordinary criminal suspect would have.

G.

Duty to Provide Security
The issue of whether to characterize counterterrorism responses as law enforcement or

military action also arises in debates about the government’s duty to provide security to potential
victims of terrorism. At least as an abstract matter, governments have a duty both to prevent and
punish crime and to protect their citizens from armed attacks. The preamble to the Constitution,
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for example, identifies insuring “domestic tranquility” and providing for the “common defense”
as two main objects of the federal government.192
But these abstract duties are not necessarily enforceable in the courts. On the contrary,
both in the United States and in foreign countries, the judiciary has shown a greater willingness
to intercede into law enforcement matters than into military affairs. Accordingly, potential
victims of terrorism may have a greater ability to obtain a judicial order directing the government
to take actions against terrorism if terrorists are seen as criminals than if they are seen as enemy
combatants.
Consider, for example, the case of A. v. United Kingdom & Ireland.193 The case arose
after IRA terrorists killed a reserve constable in Northern Ireland while he was tending to his
family’s dairy business.194 The decedent’s widow sued the United Kingdom in the European
Court of Human Rights, claiming that the United Kingdom was violating article 2(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights.195 This article mandates that everyone’s right to life
“shall be protected by law.”196 She asserted that the United Kingdom was not doing enough to
provide security and demanded greater military involvement in the anti-terrorism campaign. She
asked the court to require the United Kingdom to provide greater security from terrorist attacks
“not only by criminal prosecution of offenders but also by such preventive control, through
deployment of its armed forces, as appears necessary . . . .”197

192

See U.S. Const. pream.
8 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 49 (1986).
194
See id.
195
See id. ¶ 17.
196
European Convention, supra note 87, art. 2(1).
197
8 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 49, ¶17.
193

37

The European Commission on Human Rights, which handled the case for the court,198
ruled against her. To the extent that the terrorists were seen as an enemy threat requiring a
military response, the commission concluded that it could not act. The commission observed
that the United Kingdom had committed military forces to Northern Ireland,199 but the
commission said that it could not be “its task” to assess the “appropriateness and efficiency” of
this military force.200
In contrast, the commission apparently saw no difficulty in judging the United
Kingdom’s counterterrorism law enforcement effort. It agreed that the United Kingdom had a
duty to provide security against murder.201 But it concluded that the applicant had no claim. The
commission observed that “the applicant does not suggest that there are no laws in Northern
Ireland protecting the right to life, or that they are not applied.”202
Plaintiffs have had similar difficulty recovering from the United States for not providing
security against terrorism. Sovereign immunity generally shields the federal government from
liability in court.203 The United States has waived some of its sovereign immunity in the Federal
Tort Claims Act.204 But it has retained immunity from lawsuits pertaining to a “discretionary
function.”205
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The retention of immunity for discretionary functions generally blocks claims against the
United States for failing to provide protection against armed attacks. For example, in Macharia
v. United States, plaintiffs injured by the 1998 terrorist bombing of the United States embassy in
Kenya sued the United States for failing to secure the embassy against a terrorist attack.206 The
United States had provided a detachment of Marines to guard the facility, but they had not
succeeded in stopping a bombing by agents of al-Qaida.207 The court did not determine whether
the United States had acted negligently because it held that the discretionary function exception
to the Federal Tort Claims Act applied, and that the United States was therefore immune from
liability.208
But the discretionary function exception does not always shield the federal government
from liability for failing to protect its citizens from terrorists when those acts are viewed as
crimes. For example, in Bergman v. United States,209 the plaintiffs participated in the “Freedom
Rides” of 1961.210 They rode buses to cities in the southern United States to protest segregation.
Unknown assailants subjected them to terror, assaults, and intimidation, causing various
injuries.211 The plaintiffs claimed in part that the FBI had negligently failed to protect them from
the attacks that they endured.212 The federal government in response argued that it had immunity
from this lawsuit.213 The court rejected this argument, concluding that once the FBI had
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undertaken to stop crime, it had a duty not to perform this undertaking in a negligent manner.214
It therefore allowed the plaintiffs to bring lawsuits under the Federal Tort Claims Act.215
Although few other cases have reached this conclusion, the decision shows how judges may
view the government’s duty to provide protection against crimes by criminals as something
different from the government’s duty to provide protection against armed attacks by the enemy.

H.

Compensation for Harm
The government often uses violent measures to respond to terrorism. For example, as

described in the section on targeted killing above,216 military forces may fire missiles at a
terrorist target with the aim of killing the terrorist suspects and destroying their property.
Actions of this kind may cause three kinds of damage and injury. First, they may destroy actual
terrorist targets, like installations that al-Qaida is using for training or operations. Second, they
might damage things that the government believes are terrorist targets but which later turn out
not to be. For example, armed forces may destroy a warehouse on the belief that it contains
weapons, only to find out later that it contained civilian clothing. Third, they may cause
“collateral damage.” Collateral damage is “unavoidable and unplanned damage to civilian
personnel and property incurred while attacking a military objective.”217 For example, when
military forces fire missiles at suspected al-Qaida installations, the missiles may destroy not only
their targets but also unintentionally wreck nearby structures, vehicles, or other items.
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When the government destroys property in anti-terrorism operations, a question
sometimes arises about whether the government has a duty to pay for it. The question is not
difficult when military forces destroy actual terrorist targets: the government does not have to
pay. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has said: “A contrary rule
that, by way of example, would require the government to provide compensation for the
destruction of a vehicle (a tank, jet, etc.) used to engage United States armed forces in battle,
strikes us as absurd in the extreme.”218
But compensation for destruction of supposed terrorist targets that actually are
unconnected with terrorism and compensation for collateral damage are more difficult issues. In
the United States, the Fifth Amendment says that the government may not “take” private
property for public use without paying just compensation to the owner.219 Governmental
“taking” of property may consist of occupying, destroying, or sometimes merely preventing the
owner from using the property.220 The rationale appears to be that taxpayers as a group should
have to bear the costs of public projects, not just the people whose property is needed.221 The
innocent owners of property destroyed in anti-terrorism operations thus have some argument that
the public should share the expense of these operations. But whether that argument prevails or
not depends in large part on whether the government was pursuing the anti-terrorism action as a
military matter or as a law enforcement matter.
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The case of El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States,222 concerned an
incident that occurred after the 1998 bombings of two United States embassies in Africa.223 In
response to the bombings, the President ordered the Navy to fire Tomahawk missiles at a
pharmaceutical factory in Sudan.224 The missiles hit their target and destroyed the facility. The
White House explained at the time that the factory had links to al-Qaida and that the factory
possibly was producing a chemical used in the manufacture of nerve gas.225
The owner of the destroyed pharmaceutical plant subsequently sued the United States in
the United States Court of Federal Claims, seeking compensation for the damage under the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.226 The United States asked the court to reject the claim,
citing among other principles the rule regarding the destruction of “enemy property” discussed
above.227 Although the owner argued in response that the military exception should not apply
because the factory actually had no connection to terrorism or nerve gas,228 the court denied
relief. It held that the issue of whether a target was actually enemy property or not was a
political question and that the court had to defer to the President’s judgment.229
In contrast, at least in some jurisdictions, when law enforcement agencies are pursuing
criminal suspects and they destroy property belonging to an innocent person, they must pay for
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the damage. For example, in Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., a suspected drug
dealer broke into a nearby home while fleeing from the police.230 The police fired tear gas and
concussion grenades into the home to force the suspect out, causing extensive damage to the
building.231 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that “where an innocent third party’s property is
damaged by the police in the course of apprehending a suspect,” the government must pay just
compensation to the property owner.232
Similarly, in Steele v. City of Houston,233 a group of escaped prisoners hid out in a vacant
home that they had chosen at random. To force them out, the police set fire to the building.234
The Texas Supreme Court required the city to pay the property owner for the damage.235 The
Court said: “We do not hold that the police officers wrongfully ordered the destruction of the
dwelling; we hold that the innocent third parties are entitled by the Constitution to compensation
for their property.”236 As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in a similar case when it
required the police to pay for doors broken in the execution of a search warrant: “Since the
damage was incurred for the public good, rather than for the benefit of the private individual, the
public should bear the cost. The intended beneficiary of the police action was not [the innocent
property owner], but society as a whole.”237
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These cases suggest that, if law enforcement officials had destroyed a facility that they
thought belonged to a terrorist suspect but that actually belonged to an innocent party, the
government would have to pay for the damage caused. The political question doctrine would not
protect the government. So victims’ rights differ substantially depending on whether the
government is pursuing terrorists as enemy combatants or law enforcement agencies are going
after terrorists as criminals.

I.

Other Issues
The first claim in this article is that the dichotomous characterization of counterterrorism

measures as either law enforcement or military action has become a central part of anti-terrorism
law. The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the validity of this claim. It has shown how the
results of this characterization affect not just one or two areas, like detention and interrogation,
but many different areas. And it has shown that law enforcement/military action characterization
has been important not just in recent years, but for decades, both in the U.S. and abroad.
Yet it is important not to overstate the claim. Although characterization is important, it is
not the only issue in determining the legality of governmental responses to terrorism. On the
contrary, even if everyone were to agree on how to characterize counterterrorism actions a
number of other questions might arise. Some examples of the issues that would remain include:
•

when enemy combatants have the rights under the Geneva Convention III;238

•

when enemy combatants are entitled to “combatant immunity,” which is immunity for
punishment for lawful acts of war;239
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•

how to measure the duration of an armed conflict against terrorism for determining how
long enemy combatants may be detained;240

•

what trial procedures military commissions have to follow when they try enemy
combatants;241

•

what offenses may military commissions punish enemy combatants for having
committed;242

•

what interrogation methods may the military use in attempting to gain information from
enemy combatants;243

•

the extent to which persons held as enemy combatants have a constitutional right to due
process;244 and

•

the extent to which citizens who are enemy combatants have different rights from noncitizens.245
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But it is also important not to underestimate the current importance of characterization. Until an
initial determination is made that suspected terrorists are enemy combatants, none of the issues
listed above immediately come into dispute.

III.

THE PROBLEMS WITH DETERMINING THE LEGALITY OF
COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES BY ATTEMPTING TO CHARACTERIZE
THEM AS LAW ENFORCEMENT OR MILITARY ACTIONS
The previous part of this article has shown that legal systems around the world, for a long

time and in a great many different subject areas, have depended on characterization to determine
the legality of governmental responses to terrorism. Sometimes they characterize these
responses as law enforcement measures and, at other times, they describe them as military efforts
in an armed conflict. The characterization selected currently has important legal consequences.
Armed forces involved in a war can take actions, such as targeted killing, that the police
cannot.246 And the police can carry out actions, such as law enforcement duties, that the armed
forces cannot.247
This “military or law enforcement” classification system for determining the legality of
governmental responses to terrorism has four substantial problems. First, no standard currently
exists for deciding when terrorists are combatants as opposed to mere criminals, or when antiterrorism actions are law enforcement measures as opposed to military actions in an armed
conflict. Second, no clear standard is likely to emerge in the future because terrorists defy a
simple characterization; they resemble criminal suspects in some respects, and enemy
combatants in others. Third, even when characterization is possible, using it to determine what
246
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laws should regulate governmental responses to terrorism often produces results that are
objectionable on policy grounds. Fourth, the current system effectively gives governments
extremely broad discretion to determine the legality of their own anti-terrorism actions because
their control of the characterization process effectively allows them to select the applicable set of
legal rules.

A.

No Standard for Making the Characterization Exists
One fundamental problem with attempting to decide what body of law regulates

governmental responses to terrorism is that no commonly accepted or consistently applied
standard has developed for deciding whether to characterize terrorists as enemy combatants or
ordinary criminals. In fact, disagreement currently exists at two levels.
First, there are opposing views about the fundamental question of whether terrorists who
are not sponsored by a state can ever fall into the category of enemy combatants. As described
above, components of the United Nations appear to reject the position of most of the world’s
leading democracies on this issue. The International Court of Justice, for example, said in the
Israeli Fence case that terrorists cannot engage in “armed attacks” because they are not states.248
This position fundamentally conflicts with the unanimous view of all of the members of NATO,
which viewed the attacks of September 11, 2001, as an armed attack.249
Second, even those who agree that terrorists in proper circumstances can be viewed as
enemy combatants have not established exactly what those circumstances are. The United
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States, for instance, repeatedly has seen terrorist strikes as acts of war.250 And yet the United
States has not articulated a clear standard through which it has made that characterization. In
domestic legal cases, the United States has consistently decided not to express a standard;
instead, it has told the judiciary that it should defer to the determinations of Congress and the
President.251 The federal courts generally have granted this deference.252 In international
contexts, where the United States cannot rely on deference, the government has offered some
brief substantive explanations for its characterization of terrorists as combatants. But these
explanations lack definiteness. For example, as explained above, following the United States’
targeted killing of al-Qaida suspects in Yemen, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for ExtraJudicial Killings demanded that the United States explain why the suspects should not have
received ordinary criminal justice protections.253 In response, the United States offered this
explanation: “Al Qaida and related terrorist networks are at war against the United States. They
have trained, equipped, and supported armed forces and have planned and executed attacks
around the world against the United States on a scale that far exceeds criminal activity.”254
In the quoted passage, the United States appears to have taken the position that the
magnitude of the terrorist incident or incidents determines whether law enforcement principles or
the law of war govern anti-terrorism responses. A focus on the size of the terrorist attacks has
some justification. Certainly, it accords with general understandings about one important
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difference between ordinary crimes and acts of war. And it can explain why the United States
felt justified in using military actions in response to al-Qaida’s destruction of the United States’
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, for the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 1998, and the
attacks of September 11, 2001.255 All of these incidents caused many deaths and great
destruction of property.
But can a magnitude standard explain the United States’ military assault on Libya in
response to the 1985 bombing of the Berlin discotheque? That terrorist attack resulted in two
deaths.256 It thus does not appear to have had a “scale that far exceeds criminal activity.” And if
magnitude is the test, why did the United States not treat Timothy McVeigh or the 1993 World
Trade Center bombers as enemy combatants? McVeigh’s terrorist attack on the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City killed 168 people,257 while the World Trade Center bombing caused
six deaths and hundreds of millions of dollars in property loss.258 Yet, the United States
subjected the perpetrators of these terrorist incidents to ordinary criminal process.259 These
questions remain unanswered.
In short, despite the great importance currently placed on characterization for determining
governmental powers and individual rights, no international consensus exists on when to
characterize terrorist suspects as enemy combatants as opposed to ordinary criminals. And the
United States’ proffered standard of magnitude is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive, at
least in terms of the United States’ past practice.
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B.

Counterterrorism Measures Fit Neither Characterization Perfectly
Not only has no consensus developed on when to judge anti-terrorism responses as law

enforcement measures and when to judge them as steps taken in an armed conflict, but it also
seems unlikely that any agreement on a test ever will emerge. This prediction rests on the simple
observation that most acts of terrorism have a dual nature: they resemble warfare in some
respects and crimes in others. And this dual nature prevents easy characterization of
governmental response. Most terrorist acts resemble crimes because they are crimes. Murder is
murder, assault is assault, and kidnaping is kidnaping, regardless of whether a terrorist or a
mobster or street thug commits them. Consequently, at least in the United States, prosecutors
can and routinely do prosecute terrorists using ordinary criminal laws.260
Terrorists also often resemble criminals in terms of strategy. Terrorists, like most
criminals, usually pick easy, high value targets. Unlike military forces, terrorists and criminals
generally do not strive to use overwhelming force against the most significant enemy strengths
with the goal of obtaining a clear and incapacitating victory. To succeed, terrorists generally do
not need to cause crushing devastation any more than bank robbers need to destroy the banking
system.
On the other hand, terrorist organizations have many features in common with military
forces. First, terrorists commonly use military weapons to commit their acts. For example,
members of the terrorist organization Hamas routinely hit Israeli targets using mortars and
rockets located in the West Bank or in Gaza.261 Second, terrorists also tend to strike military
targets that ordinary criminals would have little interest in assaulting. For example, no one but
260
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terrorists or an opposing Navy would have an interest in trying to sink the U.S.S. Cole. Third,
terrorist organizations may have capabilities that outmatch those of law enforcement agencies. If
the combined military forces of the United States and its many allies need years to subdue alQaida agents in Afghanistan, certainly no police force could accomplish the same mission.
Fourth, in many instances, as the United States has argued,262 acts of terrorism exceed ordinary
criminal conduct in magnitude. Strikes like those of September 11, 2001, cause death and
destruction far beyond anything a typical criminal would ever attempt. Fifth, terrorist
organizations also often resemble military forces more than criminals in terms of their
persistence and their depth of capacity. When a member of a terrorist organization is arrested or
killed, instead of halting its operations, the organization generally finds a replacement and
continues its plans. In contrast, if the police thwart a bank robbery by arresting the would-be
perpetrator, often no subsequent robbery is likely to occur. This feature of terrorist organizations
makes them much more difficult to eradicate. Sixth, terrorists routinely take credit for their
actions. They want the world to know what they have done; that is the whole point of their
infliction of pain. In this way, terrorists resemble armed forces more than criminals, who
generally hope to avoid identification and blame.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, most acts of terrorism resemble acts of wars
more than criminal acts in terms of their most basic motivations. Governments fight wars in the
belief that organized violence will accomplish political ends that diplomacy cannot. Although
their methods are unlawful, terrorists generally act for similar reasons. But criminals generally
have more selfish goals; they commit offenses to line their pockets with money or harm their
261
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personal enemies, but not to cause political change. In fact, some definitions of terrorism focus
primarily on motivation to distinguish it from ordinary crime.263
Terrorists, acts of terrorism, and governmental responses to terrorism for these reasons all
have a dual nature. They fall partly within the realm of crime and law enforcement and partly
within the realm of armed conflict and military force. They generally defy characterization as
one or the other.

C.

Either Characterization Sometimes Produces Unfavorable Results
Even if a clear test emerged for deciding when terrorist acts move beyond being mere

crimes and instead become acts of war, another difficulty would remain: In many situations, the
unlimited application of either the laws of war or the laws regarding criminal law enforcement to
counterterrorism measures seems problematic from a policy perspective. The laws of war often
appear to afford the government more power than it needs to combat terrorism, while the rules
regarding law enforcement often provide too little.
To see this point, assume that the United States is correct that the various attacks
perpetrated by al-Qaida do constitute acts of war. Using the usual characterization approach, it
follows then that members of al-Qaida are enemy combatants. And it further follows that the
law of war governs their treatment.
Applying the law of war seems uncontroversial when the United States is attacking
armed formations of al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan. For example, most would agree that the
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United States may use deadly force against these enemies without first trying to arrest them.264
Indeed, given that al-Qaida forces remain active in Afghanistan despite years of eradication
attempts by 20,000 American and allied military personnel, any suggestion that the FBI as
opposed to the Armed Forces should have gone to Afghanistan to arrest the perpetrators of the
9/11 attacks seems hopelessly unrealistic.
But even if members of al-Qaida are enemy combatants, it may not follow that the United
States should, as a policy matter, have the power to use all of the military force against all alQaida members that the laws of war would allow it to use against more conventional enemy
combatants. Consider again the case of Jose Padilla, the American citizen who according to
stipulated facts went to Afghanistan, fought with al-Qaida against the United States, fled to
Pakistan, and then returned to the United States, where U.S. marshals arrested him at Chicago’s
O’Hare airport.265 A great deal of controversy has surrounded Padilla’s prolonged detention.
But ignore the detention issue for a moment and think instead about what the United States might
have done at the airport when Padilla stepped off the airplane. If Padilla is truly an enemy
combatant, then one school of thought might say that the United States could have shot him
immediately, without first attempting to arrest him. After all, the law of war permits this kind of
force–targeted killing—against enemy combatants.
But I suspect that most people would think that simply shooting Padilla at the airport
would be wrong. The United States did not take that action. And when asked during oral
argument at the Supreme Court whether it could have done so, counsel for the government
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tactfully avoided the question.266 Presumably the government also felt uncomfortable about the
logical consequences of its contentions that Padilla is an enemy combatant and that the laws of
war therefore should govern his treatment.
The “either law enforcement or military action” approach also may fail to accord with
widely accepted views when it prevents certain military responses to terrorism. For example,
consider again the case of John Muhammad and Lee Malvo, the notorious “D.C. snipers.”267 As
described above, observers disagreed about whether the military was violating the Posse
Comitatus Act by assisting law enforcement.268 But even assuming that everyone were to agree
that the Army was assisting in law enforcement, most people would not consider this assistance
inappropriate from a policy perspective. As one New York Times reporter put it, “[f]or thousands
of people in the Washington region ducking behind their cars as they pump gas, keeping their
children indoors or missing the high school football season, there is no limit to what should be
done to thwart the sniper who has shot 11 people this month.”269 Thus, the difficulty of
classifying the antiterrorism measures is only part of the problem with the current legal rules.
Another part of the problem is that the full application of either law enforcement rules or the
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laws of war often does not make sense from a policy perspective even if characterization can
occur.

D.

The Current System Gives the Government Considerable Discretion to Determine the
Legality of its Own Action
A further problem with reliance on dichotomous characterization is that governments

now have a great deal of discretion, after terrorist acts have occurred, to determine what law will
apply to the government’s anti-terrorism responses. This discretion has predictable
consequences. If governments believe that rules governing law enforcement offer them an
advantage, they will treat the matter as a criminal incident. But if they think that the law
pertaining to military force will yield more favorable results, they will label the terrorists
involved as enemy combatants and proceed accordingly.
The possibility that the government may have some choice over which body of law
applies to a governmental action by itself is not alarming. On the contrary, this possibility exists
in many different contexts. But generally, when the government has choices of this kind, it also
faces tradeoffs; the government usually cannot have its cake and eat it too. For example, in the
area of military justice, military commanders generally have a choice of referring charges of
misconduct to a summary court-martial, a special court-martial, or a general court-martial.270
Each of these courts-martial operates under different procedures. At a summary court-martial,
for instance, the charges are decided by a single military officer who generally is not a military
judge.271 At a general court-martial, by contrast, the accused has a right to be tried by a court

270
271

See 10 U.S.C. § 816.
Id. § 816(3).

55

consisting of a military judge and not less than five service members.272 But a summary courtmartial can impose only a limited range of punishments; it cannot order confinement for more
than a month.273 A general court-martial, in contrast, can impose life imprisonment or even the
death penalty.274 So a commander has a choice in referring charges to a court-martial but also
faces a tradeoff. The summary court-martial has simpler and speedier procedures but is limited
in its power, while the general court-martial has greater powers but affords the accused greater
procedural protections. The existence of this tradeoff preserves flexibility, without giving
commanders unlimited discretion at the expense of the accused.
This kind of tradeoff generally does not exist in the area of counterterrorism. Consider
once more the case of Jose Padilla, the American citizen who took up arms against the United
States in Afghanistan before being captured in Chicago.275 As described above, the government
initially held him as a witness in a grand jury investigation. But when that law enforcement
characterization was not sufficient to permit his continued detention, and the government
apparently lacked probable cause to charge him with a crime, the President designated him as an
enemy combatant. The federal courts subsequently have upheld his continued confinement
under this designation.276 But then inexplicably the government reclassified him as a criminal
suspect and brought criminal charges against him. There was never any tradeoff involved; the
government did not have to give up anything; it was free to switch between one characterization
and the other as it wished.
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In addition, in most other contexts in which the government has the power to exercise
discretion, some legal standard governs the exercise of that discretion. In investigating criminal
activity, for example, the government has discretion to decide what searches to conduct. It may
choose to search some premises but not others. But in exercising this discretion, the government
always faces a restriction. The Fourth Amendment imposes a standard of reasonableness on all
searches.277 This standard, although open-ended, nevertheless constrains the government’s
choices.278 And courts stand ready to enforce this standard.279
But again nothing comparable exists when it comes to the characterization of
governmental responses to terrorism as either law enforcement measures or actions taken in an
armed conflict. The President simply decides whether to characterize a person as an enemy
combatant as opposed to an ordinary criminal suspect. In the United States, the courts defer to
this decision.280 And in the international sphere, although disagreements have arisen, the United
States and other countries usually just ignore opposing views. For example, although the United
Nations General Assembly condemned the United States’ bombing of Libya, and the U.N.
Special Rapporteur for Extra-Judicial Killings condemned its targeted killing of suspected
members of al-Qaida, the United States government could and simply did disregard their
views.281
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In making these criticisms, I do not mean to suggest that the United States or other
countries have made incorrect choices when exercising the discretion that they currently have.
On the contrary, in the examples discussed, legal and policy arguments may support the
characterization of Jose Padilla either as an enemy combatant or as a criminal suspect, the
bombing of Libya, and the targeted killing in Yemen.282 But even if governments make correct
choices, they are still operating in a system that involves no tradeoffs, no standards, and not very
much review. A system of this kind over time may give rise to abuse.

IV.

THE ADVANTAGES OF SEEING COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES AS A
SEPARATE FORM OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
The forgoing parts of this article have attempted to establish the validity of two claims.

The first claim is that the legality of a wide range of governmental responses to terrorism
depends, and for a long time and in many different countries has depended, on a question of
characterization. What governments may and may not do turns on whether terrorists are seen as
criminals or enemy combatants, whether their deeds are seen as crimes or acts of war, and
whether the government responds with law enforcement officers or armed forces. The second
claim is that this emphasis on characterization as either law enforcement or military action
presents various problems. No standard currently exists or in all likelihood will emerge for
making the required characterization. Determining which law will apply by means of this
characterization often produces bad results from a policy perspective. And governments
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generally have broad, standardless, and effectively unreviewable discretion in characterization,
making abuse possible.
This part of the article now makes a third claim: In the future, it would be better to view
counterterrorism measures as a separate form of governmental action, a form which is not law
enforcement and also not military action. The legality of counterterrorism measures then should
be judged by new standards, not the rules of criminal procedure and not the laws of war. What
are these new standards? They have not been developed yet. Whoever creates them could
borrow from both the civilian law enforcement rules and the law of armed conflict or could make
altogether new rules. But the content would turn on deliberate policy choices, and not on the
awkward initial characterization of whether the terrorists are committing crimes or fighting a
war.

A.

Benefits of Judging Counterterrorism Measures as Counterterrorism Measures
Creating specialized standards to assess the legality of governmental responses to

terrorism could address problems with the current system in several ways. First, specialized
standards would reduce or eliminate the difficulties associated with the indeterminate task of
characterizing terrorists as criminals or enemy combatants and characterizing their assaults as
crimes or acts of war. Instead, specialized standards could view counterterrorism measures for
what they are: actions take against persons who share some of the characteristics of both
criminals and enemy combatants. Here are three examples of what I am talking about:
Example #1. Suppose that the Department of Defense adopts a new regulation saying
that the military may assist law enforcement in tracking snipers suspected of having killed more
59

than three persons (like the snipers who terrorized the Washington, D.C., area in 2002).283
Someone then immediately questions the legality of this regulation. Under existing law, a court
would decide the question by determining formalistically whether the military is engaged in a
law enforcement action (which might violate the Posse Comitatus Act) or a military action
(which would not violate the act). Wouldn’t it be better to have a system that focused attention
on the question whether the Department of Defense regulation is justified as a policy matter
based on its advantages and disadvantages?
Example #2. Suppose a terrorist group launches a terrorist strike against Americans and
their property and then flees to a well-known terrorist training camp in a foreign country. The
United States fires a missile at the camp and kills the perpetrators. Currently, the legality of this
action would depend on its characterization. Is the United States using military force
extraterritorially in response to a mere crime? Is it killing criminal suspects without attempting
to arrest them? Or is it fighting a war against enemy combatants? Those are the questions that
are now asked. 284 But wouldn’t it be a better system to have a specific standard for judging the
legality of this kind of governmental response to terrorism—a standard developed after careful
consideration as to whether it would be a good idea for a nation to have the power to launch
missile strikes against suspected terrorists located in a foreign country?
Example #3: To return to the Jose Padilla example, suppose military forces shot him at
O’Hare airport as he stepped off the plane. Is this action lawful? If it is a law enforcement
action it is not. But if it is a military action, perhaps it is.285 But shouldn’t the answer turn not
on characterization, but on some assessment of what is a good rule and what is not? Maybe there
283
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should be a third standard to regulate force against terrorists, which could say that—regardless of
what the police can do to criminals and the military can to do to enemy combatants—the
government cannot carry out a targeted killing against an unarmed terror suspect in the United
States who does not pose an immediate threat.286
Viewing counterterrorism as counterterrorism could narrow the government’s discretion
to choose the law that applies to its own conduct. Rather than having the government decide on
a case-by-case basis and in an unreviewable manner whether a person accused of terrorism is a
criminal suspect or an enemy combatant—and in this way determine what legal rules will
regulate the government’s actions toward him or her—a specialized law might channel the
government’s actions. For example, a specialized law might allow the President to detain
terrorist suspects as enemy combatants, but provide that detainees who could be charged with a
crime have certain rights that criminal defendants enjoy. These rights might include, in perhaps
a modified form, the right to appear before a magistrate or the right to remain silent. This kind
of standard would narrow the differences in treatment of persons detained as enemy combatants
and persons detained as criminal suspects.

B.

How to Change the Current Approach
Although this article has advocated the creation of specialized standards for assessing the

legality of counterterrorism measures, it cannot hope to specify the precise content of these
specialized laws. What the new laws should say is a complicated subject that will require long
debate and compromise, in Congress, in the negotiation of international treaties, and elsewhere.
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Further academic work may provide guidance in particular areas. But for now, here are four
general thoughts regarding various aspects of the development of these new specialized
standards.
First, whoever makes the standards should base their content on policy considerations
rather than on existing doctrinal categories. In general, they should seek to determine what
rights terrorist suspects ought to have, and what powers military forces and government agencies
should have, based on American values and the practical needs of the current situation.
For example, suppose a new treaty is negotiated regarding detention of terrorist suspects
captured on the battlefield. The drafters should consider as a policy matter how long the military
actually needs to detain them. They then should devise a rule that will meet this need while
otherwise preserving the value of liberty. The rule need not specify that the military may hold
the suspects for the duration of the conflict simply because the laws of war would permit such
detention if terror suspects were ordinary enemy combatants.287
By the same token, lawmakers generally should avoid creating antiterrorism rules based
solely on legal precedent. Relying exclusively on precedent generally will not do much to
address the problems, described above,288 that are associated with the current characterization
system. For example, a common form of argument, frequently heard in debates about
antiterrorism policy, runs as follows: “In World War II, the United States lawfully did X to the
Nazis because they were enemy combatants. Terrorists are also enemy combatants. Therefore
the law should say that the United States can do X to terrorists.” At present, the United States
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generally can justify its actions as a legal matter based on such reasoning,289 but shaping new
specialized laws on precedent may simply replicate the difficulties that reliance on
characterization currently is causing. It would be better to consider the needs of the current
situation and act accordingly.
Second, the Constitution may impose some limits on the creation of specialized standards
to regulate governmental responses to terrorism. For example, if the Fourth Amendment
requires a search warrant in a particular situation, then Congress cannot pass a new antiterrorism
law dispensing with the requirement. But this possibility should not preclude all new law
development. Treaties or legislation always could grant additional rights to terrorists who are
now classifiable as enemy combatants and who therefore enjoy limited, if any, protection of the
Fourth Amendment.290 Congress also can alter or change existing statutory rules. For example,
at present, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the military from helping civilian agencies in
searches and seizures for the purpose of law enforcement.291 But nothing in the Constitution
would prevent Congress from creating exceptions to this statute for terrorism cases.
International treaties also may restrict the United States in reforming its law. For
example, the United Nations Charter imposes limitations on the use of force and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifies requirements for domestic trials.292 The United
States cannot rewrite international treaties by itself. But it may have the option to withdraw from
them, to derogate from their provisions, or to work with other signatories for their amendment or
reinterpretation.
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Third, past experience and other factors suggest that the United States in many instances
should expect to lead the way in the creation of the specialized laws on terrorism. The United
States developed individual domestic civil and political rights that subsequent international
human rights agreements, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, later
copied.293 Similarly, the United States’ codification of the laws of war in the Lieber Code of
1863 provided the basis for subsequent international agreements on the subject.294 If the United
States chooses rules wisely, other nations are likely to follow them.
The United States ought to accept most of the burden of drafting and lobbying to bring
into force new international rules regarding terrorism. It should take on these tasks because the
world’s other leading democracies simply have less experience and less at stake in dealing with
terrorists outside of their borders. Even in Afghanistan, where allies from twenty nations are
fighting the war against al-Qaida,295 the ultimate responsibility for handling prisoners falls on the
United States. Reported information reveals that besides the United States, only Canada (which
has the second largest contingent of forces in Afghanistan296) has captured appreciable numbers
of suspected terrorists in the country, and Canada reportedly turns these suspects over to the
United States for detention and interrogation.297
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Finally, no one needs to create a comprehensive new anti-terrorism legal regime all at
once. This essay has identified difficulties in many different areas of the antiterrorism law that
stem from a reliance on a law enforcement vs. military action characterization to determine the
powers of the government. Coming up with standards to judge the legality of counterterrorism
responses could occur gradually. For example, new standards first might address the subject
matter of interrogation. Then later, they might be crafted for detentions or targeted killing.

C.

For the Skeptical: Consider the Alternatives
The idea of creating specialized standards to judge the legality of counterterrorism

measures initially may not appeal to those actively engaged in the ongoing debates about the
lawfulness of military responses to terrorism. Human rights advocates and defense attorneys
may fear that new specialized standards will provide fewer protections to suspected terrorists
than the criminal justice system currently affords. Similarly, governments using military force to
respond to terrorism may fear that, when dealing with terrorists, any departure from the laws
governing armed conflict may limit their lawful range of action.
Both sides are probably correct if they hold these views. Any new law specifically
addressing terrorism almost certainly will fall somewhere in the middle between the laws of war
and the rules governing criminal law enforcement. But opponents of the proposal on both sides
should consider the alternative, which is maintaining the status quo.
The current system is dysfunctional for the reasons spelled out in this article.
Governments for the most part dismiss critics who say that the law of war does not apply to
terrorists. The United States, for example, has told pretty much anyone who has objected, that it
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will forge ahead with targeted killings, detentions, and military commissions because it views
suspected terrorists as enemy combatants. But despite the steadfastness of the government’s
position, its opponents have had an impact. For example, although the President proposed using
military commissions to try suspected terrorists in November 2001, the legal proceedings are
only just beginning five years later. Why is that? Even though human rights groups have not
been able to block the government’s plans as a legal matter, they have caused enough commotion
to grind the effort almost to a halt. Examples like this show that neither side really is winning in
the on-going debate.
New treaties and other laws that establish what governments can and cannot do in
combating terrorist threats, without relying on the characterization of terrorists as criminals or
enemy combatants, hold potential for ameliorating the situation. These new standards would
require tradeoffs, but would provide greater certainty and less controversy. For example, under
new laws aimed specifically at terrorism, the government might lose its ability to hold suspected
terrorists indefinitely. Or it might lose its ability to conduct targeted killing missions at any time
and in any place. But the laws might state clearly when the government may use military force
as a counterterrorism measure or when it can engage in searches and seizures to catch terrorists.

D.

Emerging Examples of the Recommended Approach
Getting away from the current system undoubtedly will prove difficult. But two recent

examples illustrate how it might happen. Both of these emerging examples are imperfect, but
they do show the general idea.
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Litigants before the Israeli Supreme Court recently disputed the lawfulness of targeted
killing. A human rights group called Public Committee Against Torture in Israel sued the
government, seeking to enjoin the targeted killing of Palestinian activists.298 Its brief described
numerous incidents in which Israeli defense forces had located terrorist suspects and then shot
them or killed them with explosives.299 Like the Special Rapporteur in the Yemen incident, the
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel viewed the targeted killings as an impermissible
method of law enforcement. Its brief said: “The launching of missiles at a suspected terrorist, at
a time when he does not pose immediate danger to another person, is an execution without a
trial. The killing of a man by sniper fire, when that man is not engaged in specific activity that
endangers the life of another person, is an execution without a trial. Booby trapping the car of a
person, as suspect as he may be, is an execution of a person that has not been convicted . . . .”300
But the Israeli government did not see it that way. It responded by saying that the laws of
war allow the Israeli defense forces to attack enemy combatants. Its brief said: “there is no
argument [but] that a person who takes a direct part in the hostilities is a legitimate target,
whatever his formal characterization (member of a conscription army, uniformed, guerilla
fighter, civilian, etc.) may be.”301
The High Court of Justice did not accept either view.302 Instead, it adopted a middle
ground. It said that terrorists should be viewed not just as civilians and not just as enemy
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combatants, but instead as a third category that more correctly captures what they are: citizens
sometimes taking part in the hostilities.303 The Court said that the government may use targeted
killing against them when they are engaged in hostilities, but not at other times.304 That’s a
different standard from either what the government advocates based on the laws of war or what
the petitioners said about law enforcement rules.
This decision is not a perfect example. It still relies on military/law enforcement
characterization to some it extent. It just suggests that the characterization may change over
time, depending on what the terrorist is doing. But it is still a good example because it
recognizes that the current system is defective and that governmental counterterrorism action
does not neatly fit into the category of law enforcement or military action. Rather than sticking
with the old rules, the Court tried to think of what made the most sense in judging
counterterrorism measures.
Another example is the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which Congress passed
following the Hamdan decision.305 This act establishes military commissions for trying terror
suspects. It is not a perfect of illustration of what this article is talking about because the act is
itself a counterterrorism measure, rather than a new standard for judging the legality of counterterrorism measures. But the act does view counterterrorism as something distinct from either
law enforcement or military action. The terrorists tried by military commission have rights that
criminal suspects have, such as a right to appeal to an article III court.306 But the act also treats
suspects somewhat like enemy combatants in the sense that it does not give them the benefits of
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all the rules applicable to ordinary criminal trials.307 And Congress did not want the act’s legality
judged by ordinary standards, specifically taking the question of its lawfulness away from the
Geneva Conventions.308 Congress wanted Courts to judge the act as a unique counterterrorism
measure, not strictly as a law enforcement action and not strictly as a military action. More
developments along this line should occur in the future.

V.

CONCLUSION
At present, a specialized law addresses law enforcement agencies’ treatment of criminal

suspects. And a specialized law governs the military’s treatment of enemy combatants. But with
rare exceptions, there are no specialized standards for assessing governmental responses to
terrorism. This lack of specialized standards necessitates judging the legality of governmental
counterterrorism measures by trying to characterize them either as law enforcement or military
action. This necessary characterization makes a great deal of difference because the laws
applicable to criminal suspects differ a great deal from the laws applicable to enemy combatants.
To repeat the clearest example, the former does not allow targeted killing, while the latter
appears to do so.
The question thus arises whether this approach produces satisfactory results. This article
has argued that it does not. No standard currently exists for correctly characterizing
governmental responses to terrorism. Characterization often produces bad results from a policy
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perspective. And governments generally have broad, standardless, and effectively unreviewable
discretion in making characterizations.
A solution to this problem may lie in creating new specialized standards to govern
responses to terrorism. These laws would resemble the law of armed conflict in some respects,
but would borrow from ordinary criminal law procedures in other respects. Creating new
standards would remove many doubts about the legality of responses to terrorism and would
allow policy considerations, rather than the vagaries of characterization, to determine what rules
should apply.
Creating specialized laws will take time and it will be difficult. Some will object to
limiting the rights currently enjoyed by criminal suspects, while others will lament the loss of
authority that they believe the armed forces now enjoy. But as explained previously, both sides
might benefit from compromise. And fortunately, the new laws do not have to emerge all at
once. Instead, new standards might emerge one at a time to regulate particularly important
actions like detention or targeted killing. Israel and the United States have already successfully
begun to use this approach.
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